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EXPRESSIVE UPDATES, MUCH?
Daniel Gutzmann Robert Henderson
University of Cologne University of Arizona
This article investigates a novel use of much in a construction that has not yet been recognized
in the theoretical literature—as in Angry, much?—which we dub ‘expressive much’. Our primary
proposal is that expressive much is a shunting operator in the sense of McCready 2010, which tar-
gets a gradable predicate and adds a speaker’s evaluative attitude about the degree to which an in-
dividual stands out on the relevant scale. In particular, we argue that it does so in a way that allows
it to perform an ‘expressive question’, which can be understood as a counterpart to a polar ques-
tion, but in the expressive meaning dimension. In doing so, we present the first example of a
shunting expression in English and provide, based on Gunlogson 2008, a new model of the dis-
course context that allows us to account for the different ways that expressive and nonexpressive
content enters the common ground.*
Keywords: expressives, degree semantics, much, rising intonation, shunting expressions, multidi-
mensional semantics, common-ground updates
1. Introducing expressive much. There are classes of expressions in natural lan-
guage—slurs, interjections, honorifics, discourse particles, and so forth—that make no
truth-conditional contribution. Much recent work has argued for a multidimensional se-
mantics of these items, where their meaning is contributed in a different layer from
truth-conditional content.1 Against this backdrop, there is growing interest in expres-
sions that move content from one dimension to another. For instance, McCready (2010)
considers a Japanese adverbial yokumo, which takes a sentential argument and, in the
process of expressing a negative speaker attitude about the proposition it denotes,
‘shunts’ its propositional content out of the truth-conditional dimension. The primary
goal of the current article is to describe and analyze an underdescribed English con-
struction with a degree modifier that we argue has the same shunting effect as Japanese
yokumo. The construction is illustrated in 1, which is a naturally occurring example
taken from a comic book, where Gavin’s utterance means something roughly like Wow.
You’re really rude and it’s ridiculous.2
(1) Gramps: (Slamming the door just in front of Gavin) Well, Scott isn’t here, so
scram. 
Gavin: Wow. Rude, much?
We dub this construction expressive much (henceforth x-much).3 While x-much is
firmly colloquial, so it is possible to find English speakers who do not control the con-
struction, it is not particularly new. The earliest documented example comes from a
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1 See, for instance, Barker et al. 2010, Giorgolo & Asudeh 2012, Gutzmann 2015, Kaplan 1999, Kubota &
Uegaki 2011, McCready 2010, Portner 2007, Potts 2005, Potts & Kawahara 2004.
2 Throughout this article, we use boldface to highlight relevant aspects of examples.
3 In a fortuitous convergence of notation, the same construction has been called ‘X much’ before by Mark
Liberman on the Language Log (Liberman 2010), though in his usage X is a variable for the expression mod-
ified by much. We aim instead to emphasize the construction’s expressive character.
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1978 episode of Saturday Night Live (Sullivan 2010), though Oxford English Diction-
ary citations and discussion online pick out the late 1980s and early 1990s in particular
as an important moment for x-much, with its prominent place in the movie Heathers
and on the TV show Buffy the Vampire Slayer (Adams 2003, Dodson 2010).4 We em-
phasize its colloquiality because, whether discussing slurs, interjections, or discourse
particles, colloquial speech is particularly rich in language with expressive content,
which we argue is the key to understanding x-much. In particular, the expressive ac-
count of x-much that we develop can explain not just its semantics, but also aspects of
its syntax and discourse properties.
1.1. Overview and main theses. Providing this analysis is not the only goal of this
article, though. The basic facts that characterize the construction are not known, and so
this article plays an important descriptive role as well.5 One overarching descriptive
question we tackle is to what extent the much we see in the x-much construction can 
be assimilated to much in other constructions. In particular, we focus most intently on
the comparison of x-much to much as a VP modifier (VP-much) in sentences like She
 doesn’t dance much (Doetjes 1997, 2007, Rett 2014). This is because the x-much con-
struction, by virtue of having much in post-predicate position, looks like an elliptical
version of a VP-much construction. One of the core results of this article is that while
we can give the much that appears in the x-much construction a familiar scale-based
lexical semantics (e.g. Rett 2014, Solt 2015), the x-much construction is novel and can-
not be reduced to other familiar constructions with much, including VP-much. Along
the way we consider a variety of syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic questions that are
raised by even a cursory look at the x-much construction in 1 above.
First, while marked with question punctuation, the kind of speech act performed by the
use of x-much is not at all obvious. In this example it certainly does not seem to be an-
swer-seeking. We show that x-much utterances are neither questions nor assertions, but
expressive utterances, akin to slurs or interjections. In fact, we show that the x-much con-
struction is used to make a novel kind of expressive utterance that we call an expressive
question, which is used to align expressive attitudes in the same way that a polar ques-
tion is used to align propositional attitudes outside the expressive meaning domain.
Second, on the semantic side, note that much in 1 directly modifies a noncomparative
lexical adjective to generate an evaluative reading. It simply is not possible for much to
do this in other more well-known constructions, as we show below. This raises the
question of whether the semantics of much in the x-much construction can be assimi-
lated to the semantics of much in one of its different guises. We argue that much can be
given a scale-based semantics that is familiar from its other uses. We propose that 
x-much is a predicate of scales, conveying that the individual in question exceeds the
contextual standard for the scale, as well as the speaker’s evaluative attitude about this.
While we try to closely assimilate x-much to standard much, the fact that much in the 
x-much construction has a different distribution and range of interpretations has impli-
cations for understanding why standard much is otherwise somewhat surprisingly more
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4 Josh Millard from MetaTalk actually builds three small corpora of instances of x-much as used on
Metafilter (Millard 2010).
5 The only academic treatments of x-much that we are aware of are the sociolinguistic/media analysis-
oriented Slayer slang: A Buffy the Vampire Slayer lexicon (Adams 2003) and a talk given by Armstrong and
Schwenter (2011) at the 2011 LSA annual meeting. Even when they refer to an ‘x-much construction’, how-
ever, what they are focusing on is not quite the same construction as that we are interested in, because their
construction always involves some kind of scale reversal, which the phenomenon described in this article
does not exhibit.
restricted in distribution than you would expect if it could freely modify scales, a fact
that has been widely explored (e.g. Corver 1997, Doetjes 1997, Rett 2014, Solt 2010,
among others).
Finally, the x-much construction above is clearly ‘elliptical’. This raises questions
about its syntactic properties, as well as about how its semantic properties are composi-
tionally derived. We argue that the x-much construction is not a case of bona fide ellip-
sis, that is, one with unpronounced syntactic structure. Instead, while it is internally
complex, one of the effects of much in the x-much construction is to derive an expres-
sive, which due to its semantic type precludes further composition. This will account
for the fact that x-much, while appearing to be elliptical, is actually just unembeddable
and can only be used expressively.
Taking each of these considerations into account, our ultimate proposal is that 
x-much targets a gradable predicate and adds a speaker’s evaluative attitude about the
degree to which an individual stands out on the relevant scale, namely, that the degree
is large and ridiculously so. In this way, x-much is an operator that allows speakers to
compositionally derive expressions with expressive content. This is a sharp departure
from more well-known expressive items, like interjections, which have similar expres-
sive content, but whose content is lexically fixed.
While there is still much work to be done to motivate the proposals outlined above, the
resulting analysis fits squarely within recent work on expressive content and extends that
work to interface with richer models of discourse. In particular, the analysis is couched
in a multidimensional semantics in the Pottsean tradition (Potts 2005), called hybrid se-
mantics (Gutzmann 2015), which supplements the truth-conditional layer of meaning
with a second layer that captures the use-conditionalmeaning of an utterance. Our pri-
mary proposal is that x-much is a shunting operator in the sense of McCready 2010: its
function is to move content from the truth-conditional to the use-conditional layer.
Finally, the analysis does not stop at the level of the utterance. After determining the
content of an x-much utterance, we consider how that content enters the discourse. Our
focus is on the descriptive fact that x-much canonically occurs with rising intonation.
We adapt recent work by Gunlogson (2008) on rising declaratives to explain the effect
of rising intonation on utterances, like those with x-much, that have only expressive
content. This means enriching the context to include not just sets of propositions to
which the interlocutors are committed, but sets of expressive attitudes as well. With this
change in place, an x-much utterance can be understood as an expressive question,
which is the counterpart to a rising declarative question but in the expressive meaning
dimension. Its primary function is to seek the alignment of attitudes in the use-condi-
tional domain, just as a rising declarative seeks alignment in the truth-conditional do-
main. Though parallel, we are also able to account for differences between rising
declaratives and x-much utterances, which follow from the fact that use-conditional
content is harder to respond to than truth-conditional content.
1.2. Notes on the data used. Before beginning the analysis outlined here, a quick
methodological note is required. While it is not difficult to find English speakers with
intuitions about x-much (one of the authors, in fact, commands the construction), it is
clearly not part of standard English. This can make it difficult to do grammaticality
judgments, especially in more complex and artificial contexts where register clash is a
danger. For this reason, we rely as much as possible on naturally occurring examples
from comic books and social media, especially Twitter and Instagram; all attested, nat-
urally occurring examples used here are explicitly described as such in the text. This
type of data is especially helpful for determining the felicity conditions of x-much be-
cause they include images that display the world against which x-much is used. In the
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case of social media, before including an example in our corpus, we first checked the
user’s feed to ensure that they otherwise appeared to be a native speaker of English. Im-
ages of several of the original examples are provided in the online supplementary mate-
rials, available at http://muse.jhu.edu/resolve/64.  
2. The syntax of x-much. We start with a discussion of the internal and external
syntax of x-much, before moving on to the conversational force of x-much utterances
and the lexical semantics of x-much itself.
2.1. The internal syntax of x-much. The expression much belongs to a class of
quantity words that includes many, few, and little. These expressions have a wide syn-
tactic distribution, which has raised challenges for a unified semantic theory, though
progress has been made (e.g. Doetjes 1997, Rett 2014, Solt 2015). The quantity word
much, which is our focus here, occurs in the following core configurations identified by
Rett (2018) and Solt (2015). First, much occurs prenominally as a nominal modifier.
(2) There wasn’t much (red) wine. (N/NP modifier)
We also find much in its so-called differential use productively modifying compara-
tive/excessive adjectives.
(3) a. The white wine was much sweeter than the red.
b. The white wine was much too sweet. (comparative modifier)
Finally, much can be both a PP and a VP modifier.
(4) John doesn’t drink wine much. (VP modifier)
(5) The wine wasn’t much over our budget. (PP modifier)
While x-much looks similar to standard uses of much, we find that it can modify an
even wider class of expressions than may be immediately expected. In particular, 
x-much can productively target lexical adjectives. This already provides a point of con-
trast with much more broadly. While much can freely modify comparative/excessive
adjectives as in 3, it cannot in other constructions modify lexical adjectives that do not
have a comparative lexical semantics, like skinny.6 We see in the naturally occurring ex-
amples in 7 that x-much can target such adjectives.
(6) a. *He is much skinnier.
b. *He is much skinny.
(7) a. @EilisAbigail: Skinny much?
b. @xChrisDuran: Skinnier much. ?
The hypothesis we develop in §4 and then formalize in §5 is that x-much is a predicate
of, and so must compose with, degree predicates. The prediction is that x-much can tar-
get canonical degree predicates, like bare gradable adjectives, but also any expression
that can be coerced into a degree-predicate reading. While this may overgenerate, our
initial impression is that x-much is relatively syntactically unconstrained, occurring
freely with heads and phrases across lexical categories as long as the expression can be
interpreted as a degree predicate. We save for future work a finer-grained study of the
syntax of x-much in comparison to much in standard constructions. 
Let us go through the attested examples in 8–17 which illustrate that x-much can
occur with targets of almost any category. First, there are examples of x-much modify-
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6 We must restrict our discussion to a subclass of adjectives because, as discussed in Kennedy & McNally
2005, standard much can modify deverbal adjectives associated with lower-closed scales—for instance, much
needed. Moreover, standard much can modify lexical adjectives if they have a comparative semantics—for
instance, much different.
ing full VPs, like the following. Speakers, though, have the intuition that these are
slightly degraded, and more degraded the heavier the VP happens to be.
(8) A: We’re definitely not getting back together if that’s what you think. 
B: Wow. Flatter yourself much?
(9) Jeez, live in denial much, Chase?
In addition, we also find x-much targeting what appear to be verbal heads, that is, ex-
pressions of category V○, as illustrated in 10 and 11.
(10) A: It’s not your precious 720, and what it is is none of your concern! Now be
off with you!
B: Geez! Overreact much?!
(11) A: Guessing Upper West Side? For the shirt? 
B: Presume much?
While it is of course possible that these verbs are embedded in some kind of VP, the fact
that they always uniformly appear in the infinitive suggests that we have less structure.
Even better, we find examples like 12–13 with objectless transitive verbs like resemble
that are especially hard to detransitivize.
(12) Resemble much?
(13) The funniest part of this brilliant Burning Man parody ad is them threating to
sue over it. Resemble much?
Just as there are attested examples of x-much modifying expressions of category V○ and
VP, we also find x-much modifying both noun heads and NPs, as is illustrated by the
following (see also examples 51–52 in §4). 
(14) A: This will make a safer world. 
B: Cliché much?
(15) Jeez, birds of a feather much? Both of you need to breathe, right?
Finally, just like much in more familiar constructions, x-much is able to modify PPs. We
find attested examples like 16 and 17.
(16) Aha over the limit much?
(17) Oh I’m so getting you when i see you Jenny!! lol Against me much?
While we have not found any clear attested cases of x-much modifying expressions of
category P○, our intuition is that those prepositions that can express a gradable notion
without a nominal argument, for example nearby, should occur with x-much.
In sum, these data show that x-much has a different, though partially overlapping, dis-
tribution relative to much as it has been described in the literature.7 In particular, while
standard much has a fairly free syntactic distribution, it cannot productively target lexi-
cal adjectives. Moreover, post-predicate much in standard constructions is a VP-modifier
and cannot target V-heads. As shown in 18, an example where much unambiguously
modifies a V-head, like 12, is impossible to construct for standard much. Instead, stan-
dard much can only modify the entire VP in such post-predicate constructions.
(18) *Do they resemble much (each other)?
While the particular distribution of x-much does not rule out a unified account of the
lexical semantics of much across both x-much and more familiar constructions, the dis-
tributional data do preclude more straightforward extensions. In particular, we cannot
treat x-much constructions as elliptical VP-much constructions, which may seem attrac-
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7 Of course, even in cases in which x-much and standard much overlap, there may still be crucial differ-
ences. For instance, x-much always appears in a post-target position, while standard much precedes its target
in many cases. There are also semantic differences that are discussed in §4.
tive given that x-much occurs in post-predicate position. The fact that x-much can mod-
ify V○ heads as well as a variety of expressions directly without even a supporting cop-
ula suggests that we are not dealing with VP-modification (see §4 for semantic
arguments against this same idea).
While we cannot treat x-much as an elliptical version of a standard much construc-
tion, we can give much a partially unified lexical semantics across these constructions.
We propose in §5 that x-much, apart from its expressive semantics, is just a predicate 
of degree predicates. This is in line with recent analyses aiming to unify the semantics
of much (e.g. Rett 2014, Solt 2015). Future work should attempt to understand why 
x-much has a wider distribution, but we expect that it is due to syntactic differences, and
that we should maintain an account that treats the degree component of x-much as sim-
ilarly as possible to that of much in standard constructions.
2.2. (No) external syntax. Beyond the distributional data, the second major syn-
tactic generalization concerning the x-much construction is that once formed, it cannot
be further modified or embedded by any semantic operation. For instance, examples
19a and 19b show that an x-much construction cannot be conjoined or disjoined with a
second clause.8 Example 19c shows it cannot be conjoined below the clausal level with
other expressions of the same category as the expression modified by x-much.9 It can-
not be part of a conditional, either as the antecedent (19d) or as the consequent (19e). As
19f illustrates, the x-much construction cannot be modified by modals. Finally, example
19g shows that the x-much construction cannot be embedded under propositional atti-
tude predicates.
(19) a. *Angry, much and he left.
b. *Angry, much or not?
c. *Angry, much and bitter?
d. *If angry much, I will not talk to you.
e. *If Parker shows up late, angry much?
f. *Maybe angry, much?
g. *He said/asked angry much?
The fact is that x-much derives expressions that do not interact with other expressions in
any way. This contrasts with all other cases of modification by much, including VP-
much. As we argue later, this noninteraction can be explained if x-much is considered a
shunting expression (McCready 2010). To support this analysis, though, we first need
to demonstrate that the x-much construction has the conversational force of expressives
more generally.
3. The conversational force of x-much. Just as we have shown that x-much has a
different syntactic distribution from much in other constructions, we can also demon-
strate that x-much can only appear in clauses with expressive force, that is, clauses
whose entire content lies outside the at-issue truth-conditional dimension. This is dif-
ferent from much in all other constructions it occurs in, including the VP-much con-
struction, which show no such restriction. For this reason, we come to treat x-much
itself in §5 as an expressive shunting operator.
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8 While we preclude conjunction/disjunction at the clausal level, x-much utterances might be conjoined/dis-
joined in discourse. For instance, a referee notes that or what can follow an x-much construction as in Angry,
much? Or what?. We believe these kinds of examples involve two speech acts, which is not surprising given
that or what can form independent responses (Biezma & Rawlins 2016).
9 Once again, examples like this improve if given two speech acts—for example, Angry, much? And bit-
ter!—which is expected given the behavior of other expressives.
3.1. Second- and third-person targets. To make this argument, we consider how
the x-much construction behaves in discourse. To begin, then, it will be helpful to con-
sider how the x-much construction involves conversational participants. Examples
20–21 show that while the subject of the x-much predication can be the addressee, it
need not be. The most plausible interpretation of 21 is that Bill is overly angry, while in
20 the addressee is.10
(20) A: I %&#% hate John. 
B: Angry, much?
A: Oh shut up.
(21) A: Bill was like ‘I %&#% hate John.’ 
B: Angry, much?
A: I know, right!
We point this out because in the data below we often switch back and forth between
third-person and second-person subjects in order to construct plausible examples—for
example, answering/asking a question about yourself often involves more complex
contexts than answering/asking about a third person.
3.2. An x-much utterance is no (elliptical) question. While we ultimately
come to an expressive account of x-much, at first pass, one might think that x-much con-
structions are some sort of grammaticalized elliptical question. This is because uses of
x-much in the wild almost always occur with a question mark. This analysis would say
that the two examples in 22 are equivalent, modulo ellipsis. More pointedly, the x-much
construction would simply be an elliptical version of a VP-much sentence.11
(22) a. Angry, much?
b. Are you angry much?
While tempting, this analysis cannot work. First, note that unlike true questions, the 
x-much construction is not genuinely answer-seeking. We can see this from the fact that
x-much resists responses that take it to make a sincere question.12
(23) A: Are you angry much? 
B: Thank you for asking …
(24) A: #Angry, much?
B: #Thank you for asking …
Second, unlike a true question, x-much commits the speaker to the truth of the proposi-
tion at hand. One can follow a polar question by denying one of the answers, for exam-
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10 We have noted that when the addressee is the subject of the x-much predication, the conversation often
becomes confrontational, while when we have a third-person subject, the conversations have a commiserating
feel. We discuss why this might be the case in §6.
11 This, of course, raises the question of distinguishing an x-much construction from a string-equivalent el-
liptical question. In constructed examples, this is simple because, as shown in §§2 and 4, there are further syn-
tactic and semantic arguments against treating the x-much construction as an elliptical VP-much construction.
Thus, to force an x-much interpretation, we need merely construct the example so that the elliptical reading is
ruled out. For example, note that 22a can convey that the addressee is extremely angry, while 22b can only
mean they are often angry. This means that fixing the context so that the former reading is intended will force
the x-much interpretation. In naturally occurring examples the problem can be more complex. If the sur-
rounding discourse makes it clear that the utterance is not answer-seeking—for instance, if the addressee re-
sponds as in 21 with something like I know, right?—then the example must involve x-much. We expect,
though, that there are cases where the particular syntactic and semantic properties of the example at hand are
not disambiguating, nor is the discourse rich enough to make a clear judgment.
12 Here we only mean to show that the x-much construction cannot be used as a bona fide question. In §6.3
we discuss ways to respond to x-much utterances. What we show there is that they are expected to receive the
same range of responses as exclamatives.
ple, to prevent any negative implicatures. Example 26 shows that this is not possible
with x-much.
(25) Are you angry much? I don’t think you are.
(26) Angry, much? #I don’t think you are.
These facts show that x-much must not be able to raise issues in the same way that a
polar question does.
3.3. An x-much utterance is no assertion. The fact that x-much utterances cannot
be questions, yet commit the speaker to a proposition, suggests that they are perhaps as-
sertions. This cannot be the case though. Canonically, assertions can be used to answer a
question under discussion. Note that x-much clearly cannot be used to provide an answer
to an explicit question, unlike an assertion of intuitively similar propositional content.
(27) A: What’s up with Harry?
B: [Pointing at Harry:] #Angry, much?
(28) A: What’s up with Harry?
B: [Pointing at Harry:] He’s super angry.
3.4. An x-much utterance is no rhetorical question. While neither an answer-
seeking question nor an assertion, perhaps x-much has a different discourse status, for
instance, as an obligatory rhetorical question—that is, a non-answer-seeking question.
There are at least two arguments for why this cannot be the case. First, Sadock (1971)
shows that rhetorical questions can be modified by expressions like after all, while
bona fide answer-seeking questions cannot be. The following example shows that 
x-much resists modification by such modifiers.
(29) [You and the addressee both know that John has a quick temper. Further-
more, the addressee has just related a story about John flying off the handle.]
a. Figures. After all, isn’t John angry all the time?
b. Figures. #After all, angry, much?
A second test is that negative polarity items (NPIs) are appropriate only in rhetorical
questions, not ordinary questions (Caponigro & Sprouse 2007). This is demonstrated by
the contrast between 30 and 31. Example 32 shows that x-much, which we already
know does not form an ordinary question, also rejects NPIs.13
(30) a. After all, did John really give a damn?
b. After all, did you even lift a finger?
(31) a. I’m really curious. #Did John really give a damn?
b. I’m really curious. #Did you even lift a finger?
(32) a. #Lift a finger, much?14
b. #Give a damn, much?
A final test separating x-much utterances from rhetorical questions is their behavior
with respect to mirative markers like wow. Because rhetorical questions require their
answer to be known, they cannot be prefaced with a genuine indication of surprise.
Compare the rhetorical question in 33 with the bona fide question in 34.
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13 It is perhaps surprising to say that the x-much construction rejects NPIs given that much is often taken to
be an NPI. While this is true, there is additional evidence that x-much is simply not an NPI. If x-much were an
NPI, we should expect it to occur with the NPI expression in pairs like any ~ no. In fact, we always find 
x-much appearing with the expression that is not an NPI. For instance, we have many attested examples like
no class, much?, but we never see #any class, much?, which is what we would expect if x-much were an NPI.
14 Note that the reading we are looking for in 32 has the speaker accusing some individual of working ex-
cessively or caring excessively, which would put it on par with the other kinds of examples discussed here.
(33) A: John was late to work again.
B: (#Wow!) Isn’t he like that.
(34) A: John was late to work. 
B: (Wow!) Is he like that?
In contrast to rhetorical questions, x-much utterances felicitously occur with mirative
markers and, in fact, commonly do so in natural examples such as the following.
(35) wow! Angry much? Where did that come from? I never said anything to
warrant that one ::thinking face emoji::
(36) What?! Angry much
(37) Wow what? Angry much?
These facts are challenging for an account that tries to reduce the x-much construc-
tion to a kind of grammaticalized rhetorical question, but they are consistent with the
expressive account we now propose.
3.5. An x-much utterance is an expressive speech act. So far, we have only
come to negative conclusions regarding the conversational force of x-much utterances.
So let us now come to our positive proposal, which is that x-much utterances make a
purely expressive contribution, without any truth-conditional content. In particular, the
use of an x-much construction expressively conveys that a contextually salient individ-
ual has the property in question and that the speaker displays an evaluative attitude
about this fact.15 At first pass we might want to assimilate it to what we see in other
 degree-based expressive constructions like exclamatives, but we think the x-much con-
struction conveys a slightly different expressive attitude. Note that while an exclama-
tive like How angry you are! expresses that the addressee greatly exceeds that standard
for angriness, just like Angry, much?! can, the latter involves an evaluative component
that the former lacks. In particular, exclamatives canonically involve the speaker’s sur-
prise at p, while the x-much construction canonically involves something more like the
speaker mocking p. While it is hard to pinpoint the quality of this evaluative attitude,
we propose that it is something akin to ‘ridiculous’—that is, the degree the target pos-
sesses on the relevant scale exceeds the standard in a funny or absurd amount, depend-
ing on the context. In most cases, this comes down to the expression of a negative
judgment, which accords with native-speaker intuitions about its use. That said, we can-
not treat x-much as uniformly expressing a negative evaluative attitude. We find natu-
rally occurring examples used positively, often in a playful way. The example with
resemble presented in 12 was such a case, for instance, and we will see below some
more examples that are most likely not intended to express a negative attitude.16
3.6. An x-much utterance is an expressive question. Even though the use of 
x-much is an expressive, it works slightly differently from other expressive utterances
like exclamatives or purely expressive insults like You damn idiot!. Recall that we said
above that x-much utterances can constitute neither elliptical polar questions nor rhetor-
ical questions. But why are they almost exclusively used with question marks? We think
that this is because of another important property of the x-much construction that we
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15 Note that, strictly speaking, the evaluative attitude displayed by an x-much utterance is factive and this
presupposes the first part. So strictly speaking, we have an expressive attitude with a factive presupposition.
For ease of exposition and analysis, however, we roll both aspects into the same expressive meaning dimen-
sion. For discussions of the observation that expressive content can come with its own presuppositions, see
Gutzmann 2019a, Liu 2012.
16 Another point of variation is that x-much utterances can also be used ironically in situations in which the
person in question obviously cannot have the property in question.
have not yet addressed. In spoken language, x-much utterances are obligatorily used
with a rising intonation. This can be seen in the pitch track in Figure 1 for a naturally
occurring example. Note that there is a 100 Hz rise over the course of the utterance,
with a pronounced rapid rise on x-much itself.
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17 This is a naturally occurring example from the Incomparable podcast, episode 167 (https://www.the
incomparable.com/theincomparable/167/). The example occurs around 55:45.
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Figure 1. Pitch track for a naturally occurring x-much example: Low self esteem, much?.17
What does this rising intonation do in x-much utterances? Even though we stated that
x-much utterances are no ordinary truth-conditional questions (nor rhetorical questions
derived from them), there is still some question-like aspect to them insofar as they seem
to require some reaction from the hearer. That is, even if an x-much utterance does not
seek simple answers, the addressee should be in an epistemic position to react to it. In a
certain sense—which we spell out formally in §6—x-much utterances seek mutual
alignment of expressive attitudes and therefore can be viewed as expressive ques-
tions. Instead of being information-seeking questions, they rather are (expressive-)atti-
tude-alignment-seeking questions.
4. Semantic properties of x-much. Section 2, which focused on the syntax of 
x-much, showed that it has a disjoint distribution from much across standard construc-
tions. In this section, we see similar facts in the domain of semantics. In particular, x-
much modification permits a disjoint set of readings from much across the standard
constructions in which it appears. That said, our goal is to keep the lexical semantics of
much in the x-much construction as close as possible to that which is familiar from stan-
dard much. We believe that this is possible given the nontechnical characterization of
the meaning of the x-much construction in previous sections: namely, it is an expressive
construction, one that conveys an evaluative attitude about the degree to which an indi-
vidual stands out on a measure provided by the expression it modifies. Modulo the ex-
pressive aspect, this seems akin to recent accounts of much in which it is a scalar
modifier, applying to a scale or set of degrees, and asserting that the scale has a partic-
ular measure (Rett 2018, Solt 2015). The following section provides a formal proposal
that extends this semantics of much to the x-much construction. Before that, though, we
look again at the empirical lay of the land.
4.1. X-much as a verbal modifier. We start with comparing the range of readings for
x-much and much as a VP-modifier. VP-much can have a variety of norm-related read-
ings, depending on the scale that can be constructed from the context and lexical content
of the VP.18 The default reading of VP-much concerns frequency scales, as in 38 and 39.
The most natural reading of 38, for instance, is as a question about whether the addressee
comes around often. It is norm-related because a positive answer would commit the re-
spondent to coming around more often than the contextually specified standard.
(38) Do you come around here much?
(39) Bill doesn’t dance much.
While frequency is the most easily accessible scale, others are possible depending on
the lexical content in the VP. For instance, 40 has a norm-related reading concerning a
measure of resemblance, while 41 has a norm-related reading concerning a measure of
slippage (in addition to a possible frequency-based reading).
(40) Does Erica resemble Caitlin much?
(41) The rope didn’t slip much.
We find the same kinds of readings when x-much modifies V○ and VP expressions. For
instance, 13, repeated here as 42, involves a norm-related reading based on the verb re-
semble, as in 40. The naturally occurring example in 43 parallels 41 where the relevant
scale orders amounts of slippage.
(42) The funniest part of this brilliant Burning Man parody ad is them threating to
sue over it. Resemble much?
(43) Yay gendered shaming language now. Mask slipping much?
In addition to these examples, we also see frequency scales with x-much. Consider the
following attested example where the context clearly shows that we have a norm-re-
lated frequency reading.
(44) 5 stories in less than a minute? Tweet and run much?
4.2. X-much as an adjectival modifier. While we see similar ranges of readings
for VP-much and x-much when modifying verbal expressions, things begin to pull apart
when we consider other kinds of expressions. A clear case are adjectives, which x-much
can modify with a norm-related reading. The following attested examples from Twitter
accompanied pictures that display that the chicken wings in 45 and Harry’s cousin in 46
truly do stand out on the lexically given scales, namely spiciness and height.
(45) @CarooDavi #picstitch spicy much jorge?
(46) @sarcasticwbu wow tall much? RT @CalmYourCarrots: Harry’s cousin
makes Niall look like a real life leprechaun ...
The fact that x-much can directly modify simple adjectives to generate norm-related
readings is surprising because this is not possible with much in standard constructions,
though other degree modifiers like very are perfectly acceptable.19
(47) Harry’s cousin is #much/very tall.
(48) Those wings are #much/very spicy.
Note that we cannot try to eliminate this peculiarity of x-much by saying that examples
like 45 and 46 involve a predicative adjective, with x-much modifying the VP contain-
ing the adjective. The problem is that while much can occur in this configuration, the
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18 We use norm-related, following Bierwisch 1989, to speak of readings that make reference to a degree on
a scale that exceeds a contextually specified standard.
19 The one exception is so-called much-support (Bresnan 1973, Corver 1997, Solt 2010, among others).
only available norm-related reading is the frequency-based one. That is, the following
equalities do not hold, and the sentences with much-modification are nearly infelicitous
given that the frequency reading is not particularly plausible.
(49) Is Harry’s cousin tall much? ≠ Is Harry’s cousin very tall?
(50) That wing wasn’t spicy much. ≠ That wing wasn’t very spicy.
The fact that x-much permits norm-related readings with simple adjectives already
makes it distinct from much in standard constructions. This is the core way that x-much
is semantically distinct from much as normally understood.
4.3. X-much as a nominal modifier. We have seen that in the verbal domain x-much
supports a range of readings similar to that of standard much, while in the adjective 
domain, the range of readings diverges—x-much licenses norm-related readings with
simple lexical adjectives. In the nominal domain we see that x-much has a wider se-
mantic distribution than much in standard constructions. Consider the following natu-
rally occurring examples that illustrate the availability of norm-related readings based
on quantity scales, witnessed by the fact that it is the large amount of guitars and wine,
respectively, that prompts the use of the x-much construction.
(51) Guitars much?
(52) Wine much?
Note here that x-much actually shares this species of norm-related reading with prenom-
inal much, though only with mass nouns. In the case of count nouns, we see many pre -
nominally, which is often taken to be an allomorph of much.
(53) Did you drink much wine?
(54) Did you play many/*much guitars?
As before, we cannot analyze examples like 51 and 52 as elliptical copular clauses with
VP-much because VP-much does not allow such readings, as shown by the following
inequalities.
(55) a. Were there guitars much? ≠ Were there many guitars?
b. There wasn’t wine much. ≠ There wasn’t much wine.
The fact that x-much has norm-related quantity readings with count nouns as in 51,
while much usually cannot appear in such environments (e.g. 54 and 55), shows once
again that the x-much construction is a unique construction and cannot easily be treated
as an extension of one of the other constructions in which much standardly occurs.
While x-much both has a unique syntactic distribution and licenses a unique class of
readings in those syntactic contexts, the fact is that all of the readings we see with 
x-much are norm-related. Thus, the lexical semantics of x-much looks identical to that
of much across the more familiar constructions in which it occurs. The formal account
that we develop below respects this. We want to account for the fact that x-much gener-
ates norm-related readings similar to those of standard much, as well as the fact that the
availability of such readings is slightly different—for example, with simple lexical ad-
jectives and count nouns. Furthermore, our analysis must also account for the fact that
the x-much construction has expressive conversational force.
5. Formal proposal. In order to account for the observed properties of x-much, we
assume a multidimensional semantics in the Pottsean tradition (Potts 2005). In particu-
lar, our analysis is based on the idea of hybrid semantics in Gutzmann 2015, that is, a
multidimensional semantics in which the ordinary truth-conditional layer of meaning is
supplemented with an additional meaning dimension that captures the use-conditional
118 LANGUAGE, VOLUME 95, NUMBER 1 (2019)
meaning of an utterance.20 This use-conditional tier not only features expressive con-
tent in the narrow sense—as contributed by, say, expressive adjectives, slurs, or inter-
jections—but also other aspects like the discourse-functional meaning of various
particles (Gutzmann 2013, McCready & Takahashi 2013), vocatives (Eckardt 2014,
Predelli 2008), sentential force (Gutzmann 2015, Portner 2007), or even the givenness
of backgrounded material (Kratzer 2004).21
5.1. Combining truth and use conditions. To illustrate the core idea of hybrid se-
mantics, consider an utterance of the following sentence, which contains the expressive
attributive adjective damn.
(56) That damn Parker got the best shot of Spiderman.
The idea of a multidimensional approach to use-conditional content, and hybrid seman-
tics in particular, is that the meaning of an utterance like 56 must be captured by both its
truth-conditional (TC) content and the use conditions (UC) contributed by the expres-
sive adjective.
(57) TC: ‘That damn Parker got the best shot of Spiderman’ is true, iff Parker got
the best shot of Spiderman.
UC: ‘That damn Parker got the best shot of Spiderman’ is felicitously used,
iff the speaker has a negative attitude toward Parker.22
While the truth-conditional content of a sentence is traditionally understood as a set of
possible worlds (namely, those worlds in which the truth-conditional content of the sen-
tence holds), we render the use-conditional content as a set of the contexts in which the
sentence is uttered felicitously (Gutzmann 2015).23
This is the basic idea of hybrid semantics, which goes back at least to Kaplan’s 1999 in-
fluential manuscript, and it is rather independent of how it is actually formulated. How-
ever, the multidimensional type-based system pioneered by Potts (2005) provides a natu-
ral formalization of hybrid semantics and has sparked a lot of subsequent work extending
and modifying Potts’s original system. Since, as we already have shown, the interaction
of x-much with other expressions is not that rich, we use an informal fraction-like tower
notation (Gutzmann 2013) and write the use conditions on top of the truth-conditional 
content in the following way, while saving the formal details for the appendix. 
use-conditional content of e
(58) expression e = truth-conditional content of e
Using this notation for 56, we can write its meaning as follows.
(59) That damn Parker got the best shot of Spiderman.
damn(Parker)
= got(the-best-shot-of-Spiderman)(Parker)
Note that damn is present only at the use-conditional layer and that the truth-conditional
meaning is unaffected by it. For this reason, expressives like damn can be called ex-
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20 Alternatives to the framework in the Pottsean tradition are suggested, among others, by Barker, Bernardi,
and Shan (2010) and Kubota and Uegaki (2011), who use continuations, or Giorgolo and Asudeh (2011,
2012), who use an approach based on the application of monads to natural language (Shan 2001).
21 In contrast to Potts’s second dimension, which focused on his notion of conventional implicatures, the
use-conditional dimension does not include appositives or other supplements, for which a use-conditional
analysis seems inadequate. See, among many others, Amaral et al. 2007, AnderBois et al. 2013, Koev 2013,
Nouwen 2007, Schlenker 2010, and Syrett & Koev 2015 for some discussion.
22 Alternatively, the negative attitude of damn can target the entire proposition that Parker got the best shot
of Spiderman. See Frazier et al. 2014, Gutzmann 2019b on this phenomenon.
23 See also Predelli 2013 for a similar way to think about use-conditional content.
pletive expressives (Cruse 1986:273), since they could be omitted if one took a
purely truth-conditional perspective. In Potts’s (2005) original work, these are the only
type of expressives, but this view has been shown to be too restrictive (Gutzmann 2011,
2015, McCready 2010). Of particular interest for the purposes of this article are the
shunting expressives first studied by McCready (2010). What is special about these
can best be described with reference to how they differ from expressives like damn.
Note that when we look at just the combination of damn with its argument, the truth-
conditional content of the argument is not altered by the presence of damn. Instead, it
remains unmodified, so that the truth-conditional meaning of damn Parker is the same
as that of Parker.
damn(Parker)
(60) a. damn Parker = Parker

b. Parker = Parker
In contrast to this, shunting expressives do not pass their argument back to the truth-
conditional dimension. Instead, they shunt their truth-conditional argument away to the
use-conditional dimension in a resource-sensitive fashion, leaving nothing back in the
truth-conditional layer. For instance, McCready (2010:§3.3) discusses the Japanese ex-
pression yokumo, which, when used in a declarative, transforms an ordinary assertion
into a kind of negative exclamative.
(61) Yokumo Dallas to kekkon shita na!
yokumo Dallas with marry did pt
‘He did an amazingly stupid and shocking thing by marrying Dallas!’ 
(Japanese; McCready 2010:40)
It does this by taking the propositional content as its argument and returning a negative
attitude toward it, together with a display of surprise at the use-conditional dimension.
Crucially, it does not pass anything back to the truth-conditional layer, so it is left
empty. We can state this informally as follows.
The speaker thinks S is bad and is surprised by S
(62) yokumo S = 
That is, yokumo does not leave anything meaningful behind in the truth-conditional di-
mension. Accordingly, a yokumo sentence cannot be used to make an assertion, since it
lacks the necessary propositional content; rather, it can only be used to perform an ex-
pressive speech act.
5.2. X-much is a shunting expressive. What we sketched about yokumo and shunt-
ing expressives brings us back to our main topic, since it seems to be very similar to
what happens when x-much is applied to its target phrase.
x-much(rude)
(63) Rude, much? = 
Analyzing x-much as a shunting expressive correctly captures the fact that once x-much
is applied to its target argument, the entire construction cannot compose with truth-con-
ditional operators like negation, conjunction, or disjunction, as no meaningful truth-
conditional content is left behind. Therefore, an operator like negation, which arguably
has only truth-conditional content and can only search for its argument in the truth-
conditional dimension, cannot find its argument and the composition cannot proceed.
Schematically, this can be depicted as in 64b.24
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24 For more formal rendering of this, see the definition for the shunting application (SA) in a multidimen-
sional system in the appendix. The core idea is that in order for this application to work, both the function and
the argument must be at the lower, truth-conditional level, which is not the case in 64.
(64) a. *Not rude, much?
 rude(much)
b. not 
In addition, the shunting analysis also captures the fact that the entire contribution of
the x-much construction is in the use-conditional dimension and that it therefore is not
asserted, while still committing the speaker to its content.
5.3. Lexical semantics of x-much. As for the concrete lexical semantics of x-much,
as noted above our goal is to assimilate it to standard much to the greatest extent possi-
ble. Along these lines, we follow two recent unified accounts of much, namely Rett
2014 and Solt 2015, in which much is a predicate (or modifier).25 In a norm-related en-
vironment, the result is the schema in 65.
(65) much(D) is true in a context c just in case max(D) exceeds the contextual
standard for D in c.
Thus, if we take a bare adjective like rude to denote a relation between individuals and
degrees, then after its individual argument is satisfied, it will denote a predicate of de-
grees like 66—the canonical object to which much can apply, as shown in 67. Note that
we follow, for example, Rett 2008b in assuming that adjectives first compose with their
individual argument to produce a degree predicate.
(66) rude(x) g = the set of degrees of rudeness g(x) possesses.
(67) much(rude(x)) g is true in context c just in case max(rude(x) g) exceeds
the contextual standard for rudeness in c.26
We take this analysis of standard much wholesale and apply it to x-much with two
modifications. First, x-much, unlike standard much, is always norm-related, which we
build into the lexical semantics of the former by requiring the maximum degree of the
scale argument to exceed the contextual standard.27 Second, recall that x-much conveys
not only that some individual has the property in question, but also a speaker attitude of
ridicule.28 We also trivially alter 67 so that it denotes sets of contexts, which we need
for our expressive semantics. Because the x-much construction does not allow an overt
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25 While Rett (2014) and Solt (2015) both treat much as taking a degree-predicate argument, they differ in
terms of whether the arguments are degree modifiers with the standard introduced explicitly or degree predi-
cates with the standard introduced pragmatically. We take the latter approach, but there is nothing about our
account that is inconsistent with the other view.
26 Note that max(rude(x) g) denotes the maximal degree of rudeness g(x) possesses.
27 Instead of lexicalizing this, we could instead give x-much a non-norm-related semantics and then require
it to compose with an exclamative illocutionary force operator. Rett (2008a) shows that exclamatives must
have a norm-related degree reading and proposes an operator E-force to enforce this requirement. We cannot
borrow E-force directly because x-much does not have other properties of exclamatives like mirativity, in-
stead expressing ridicule or laughability, but in future work it would be interesting to explore the cross-
construction requirement that expressives have norm-related readings.
28 Note that in what follows we hardwire ridicule into the meaning of x-much. This raises two questions.
The first is whether it should be hardwired. We think it must be. An alternative that says, for instance, that 
x-much constructions are just exclamatives and get this component pragmatically by virtue of being morpho-
logically marked in comparison to canonical exclamatives would predict this component to be defeasible,
which it is not.
The second question concerns how to encode the evaluative component in the semantics. We have chosen
to say that the speaker conveys that the differential degree is ridiculously large. We do not mean by this that
the degree is merely very large, but that it is so in a way that is ridiculous. This is merely a first pass because
this article does not focus on the fine-grained lexical semantics of evaluative attitudes. We think, though, that
a judge-based semantics would be appropriate, since ridiculous obviously is a predicate of personal taste
(Lasersohn 2005). That is, this construction appeals not just to a contextual standard, but also to an individ-
ual’s subjective judgment about what makes it ridiculous for an individual to exceed a contextual standard.
subject, we assume, as shown in 69, that a free variable resolved by the (contextually
given) variable assignment determines what the expression modified by x-much is pred-
icated of.
(68) x-much(D) g = {c : max(D g) exceeds the contextual standard for D g in c,
and cS (the speaker) thinks the difference between max(D g) and the contex-
tual standard to be ridiculously large.}
(69) Rude, much?
x-much(rude(x)) g = {c : max(rude(x) g) (‘the maximal degree of rude-
ness of the contextually specified individual g(x)’) exceeds the contextual
standard for rudeness in c, and the speaker thinks the difference between
max(rude(x) g) and the contextual standard to be ridiculously large.}
The formalization in 69 thus says that the use of x-much is felicitous—or, as Kaplan
(1999) put it, ‘expressively correct’—if the inferred referent exhibits the gradable prop-
erty to a degree that exceeds the standard of comparison, which is the normal contribu-
tion of much, and if the speaker judges the amount the standard is exceeded to be
ridiculous. This approximately captures the contribution of x-much.
6. Expressive discourse updates and expressive alignment. One important ob-
servation of the x-much construction is not reflected in the analysis sketched in the pre-
vious section. As discussed in §3.6, we believe that the orthographic question mark
indicates the rising intonation that obligatorily accompanies x-much utterances.
While it would be ideal if we could derive a requirement for rising intonation from ei-
ther the lexical semantics of x-much or the fact that it is a shunting operator, we do not
believe this is possible. Previously identified shunters, like yokumo in Japanese, have no
such requirement, and standard much does not necessarily bear such intonation.29 We are
forced, then, to say that rising intonation is just a grammaticalized aspect of the x-much
construction. Once we acknowledge the requirement for rising intonation we can ask
whether it has a transparent contribution to the meaning of the construction. Recall that
we intuitively characterized x-much utterances as expressive questions. Spelling out 
this intuition in a more precise way and connecting it to rising intonation is our aim for
this section.
Rising intonation is known to have an important semantic effect by shaping how an
utterance updates the context with its content. This is seen most clearly in the well-
known case of rising declaratives, which are felicitous in a different range of contexts
from their counterparts with falling intonation. While there are a variety of accounts of
rising intonation (see, for example Gunlogson 2003, 2008, Malamud & Stephenson
2015, among others), all agree that rising intonation ensures that the content of an utter-
ance cannot simply be added to the common ground. Against this backdrop, the core in-
tuition underlying our proposal is that whatever rising intonation does in the
truth-conditional dimension, this is what it does in the expressive dimension with 
x-much. Fleshing out this intuition, though, means building a novel formal model of
how expressive meaning enters the discourse, and then showing that rising intonation
can have a similar effect in the expressive domain. The goal of the current section is to
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29 While we have no synchronic explanation for the obligatory rising intonation, there are plausible dia -
chronic explanations. In particular, standard much, especially adverbially, has an NPI-like distribution (e.g.
Liberman 2010). It is possible that if the x-much construction passed through a stage where it was an NPI em-
bedded in a bona fide question licensing its appearance, the concomitant rising intonation could have been
reinterpreted as part of the construction.
build just such an account, and to show that it makes correct empirical predictions about
the behavior of x-much utterances in discourse.
6.1. Rising intonation in declaratives. Because our analysis allows for a partial
unification of rising declaratives and x-much, it is helpful to start with the former,
whose properties are better understood. We follow closely the analysis of rising declar-
atives in Gunlogson 2008, but the particulars of our formal implementation are differ-
ent, though not substantively so. Gunlogson’s analysis of rising declaratives depends
crucially on the structure of the context, which consists of two sets of propositions for
each interlocutor. The first is a set of discourse commitments—roughly those propo-
sitions whose truth the interlocutor accepts for the purposes of the conversation. The
second is the source set, which is the set of propositions whose truth, for the purposes
of the conversation, the interlocutor vouches for. In a normal assertion, the proposition
at hand is added to both the speaker’s discourse commitments and source set. The idea
is that by asserting a proposition the speaker vouches for its truth, and so of course, a
fortiori, the speaker accepts its truth for the purposes of the conversation.
The difference between being a source and being committed, and thus the need to
distinguish source sets and discourse commitment sets in the discourse model, can be
seen in reactions to assertions. Gunlogson (2008) considers the contrasting behavior of
the particles oh and yes in response to a declarative assertion.
(70) A: John bought a guitar.
a. B: Oh (I didn’t know that/#I knew that). #He didn’t buy a guitar.
b. Bʹ: Yes (#I didn’t know that/I knew that). #He didn’t buy a guitar.
Both oh and yes replies commit the second speaker to the proposition expressed by the
first, shown by the infelicity of a subsequent assertion to the contrary. That is, both re-
actions ensure that the proposition at hand becomes a discourse commitment of the
speaker. They differ, though, in that oh cannot precede an assertion of prior knowledge,
while yes cannot precede an assertion of prior ignorance. This difference suggests that
the yes response sets the speaker up as an independent source, that is, an interlocutor
who vouches for the truth of the proposition, while the oh response precludes this. The
discourse particles can then be analyzed as follows: both oh and yes add a proposition
to a speaker’s set of discourse commitments, but yes differs by also adding that propo-
sition to a speaker’s source set. A yes response should then be infelicitous with a subse-
quent assertion of prior ignorance because it clearly undermines the speaker’s ability to
independently vouch for the truth of the proposition.
Having motivated source sets and discourse commitments, we can begin to formalize
the notion of a context and discuss the ways information can enter it. The formal details
are presented in the appendix.
Gunlogson (2008) treats the context as a collection of sets of discourse commitments
and source sets for each interlocutor. The discourse commitments of an agent x—
DCx—is the set of propositions ϕ such that ‘x believes ϕ’ is a mutual belief of every con-
versational participant (including x). Note that the common ground (CG) is recoverable
by taking the intersection of the discourse commitment sets of all the conversational
participants. In addition to tracking discourse commitments, the context also tracks the
sources of those commitments. That is, the source set of an agent x—SSx—is the set of
propositions whose truth is (independently) vouched for by that participant. It makes no
sense for an agent to be a source for a proposition without also having that proposition
as a discourse commitment. For this reason we assume that contexts are licit only if SS
is a subset of DC for each interlocutor. Thus, the default effect of assertion, which pub-
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licly commits the speaker to the proposition as a source, can be formalized as adding
the proposition to the SS (and DC) for the speaker.
We are now in a position to give the analysis of rising intonation in Gunlogson 2008,
which will be mirrored in the expressive domain to account for the behavior of x-much
utterances in discourse. The core proposal is based on the idea of a contingent dis-
course move. A discourse move that has been rendered contingent has its normal effect
on the context, but only provisionally. It is made permanent only if some condition is
satisfied by the addressee. Thus, contingent discourse moves are inherently interac-
tional. Gunlogson’s proposal is that rising intonation renders a discourse move contin-
gent. In the case of a declarative, which is canonically asserted committing the speaker
(here: α) to the proposition at hand, rising intonation transforms it into a contingent
commitment.
(71) Contingent commitment (Gunlogson 2008:123, ex. 46): A discourse
move µ committing an agent α to ϕ is a contingent commitment if:
a. β ≠ α is implicitly authoritative30 with respect to ϕ at the time of µ, and 
b. it is inferable in the discourse context that α’s commitment to ϕ as a
source will be withdrawn unless the discourse move immediately suc-
ceeding µ has the effect of committing β to ϕ as a source.
We now have Gunlogson’s analysis of rising declaratives. Canonically, declaratives are
asserted: they add the denoted proposition to the speaker’s discourse commitments, as
well as the speaker’s source set. Rising intonation on a declarative would then render
this move contingent, as in 71. In particular, it becomes felicitous only if the addressee
is inferable as a source for the proposition at hand, and the speaker is made a source
only if the addressee ratifies herself as a source also. A successful update with a rising
declarative results in a particularly harmonious context. Both interlocutors end up not
only committed to the proposition (which is the default effect of a falling declarative)
but also marked as a source for that proposition. In this way, rising declaratives can be
seen as a tool for seeking total contextual alignment on a proposition. The analysis pre-
sented below shows that utterances with x-much have the same effect in the expressive
dimension. First, though, it is useful to consider a few important predictions about the
behavior of rising declaratives under Gunlogson’s analysis. In doing so, we simultane-
ously show that x-much utterances behave similarly, which motivates our (partially)
unified treatment.
6.2. Shared behavior of x-much utterances and rising declaratives. To
begin, Gunlogson notes that declaratives are infelicitous in discourse-initial contexts or
contexts that are neutral with respect to the proposition denoted by the declarative. This
is because rising declaratives seek to update the context so that both speaker and ad-
dressee are a source for the proposition at hand. The discourse context when the rising
declarative is uttered must support the inference that both speaker and addressee are
plausible sources (with the addressee being the superior source). Gunlogson (2008, exs.
9–10) provides the following contrasting examples. In example 72, the addressee, by
virtue of being outside, can be safely assumed to be a source for a weather-related
proposition. In contrast, the speaker in this context is completely uninformed. The ris-
ing declarative is predicted to be bad in this context precisely because it (conditionally)
commits the speaker to being a joint source with the addressee for the proposition, but
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30 An agent is implicitly authoritative with respect to ϕ if it is inferable from the context that the agent
would be a source for ϕ or ¬ϕ if committed to either. Essentially, it is an expectation about a conversational
participant’s knowledge state.
in this context it is mutually discernible by all conversational participants that the
speaker cannot be a source.
(72) [Robin is sitting in a windowless computer room with no information about
current weather conditions when another person enters from outdoors. Robin
to newcomer:] 
a. #Is it raining?
b. #It’s raining?
In contrast, example 73 is not neutral with respect to the relevant proposition. Because
of the addressee’s clothing, the speaker can reasonably conclude that it is raining. The
rising declarative is thus a felicitous way for the speaker to establish joint commitment
to that fact as a source on par with the addressee.
(73) [Robin is sitting, as before, in a windowless computer room when another
person enters. The newcomer is wearing a wet raincoat and boots. Robin to
newcomer:]
a. Is it raining?
b. It’s raining?
These examples show that a rising declarative cannot be used when the speaker cannot
be construed as a source. We see a similar effect when the addressee cannot be con-
strued as a source. Here the rising declarative contrasts with a falling declarative.
(74) [Robin is sitting with Bill, as before, in a windowless computer room. Robin
looks at her phone and sees that the weather radar shows a front moving
overhead. Bill is lying on the couch doing nothing. She says to him:]
a. #It’s raining.
b. #It’s raining?
This type of example can be made felicitous if Robin is given some reason to believe
that Bill could also be a source, as 75 shows.
(75) [Robin is sitting with Bill, as before, in a windowless computer room. Robin
looks at her phone and sees that the weather radar shows a front moving
overhead. Bill is on the computer and Robin can see he’s looking at a
weather website. She says to him:]
a. It’s raining.
b. It’s raining?
As before, we see the exact same pattern with x-much. In a repetition of the contexts
above we see that an x-much utterance is felicitous only when the speaker is a plausible
source for the expressive attitude.
(76) [Robin is sitting in a windowless computer room with no information about
current weather conditions when another person enters from outdoors. Robin
to newcomer:] 
#Rainy, much?
(77) [Robin is sitting, as before, in a windowless computer room when another
person enters. The newcomer is wearing a wet raincoat and boots. Robin to
newcomer:] 
Rainy, much?
Similarly, x-much is infelicitous in contexts where the addressee cannot be known to be
able to join in as source for the expressive attitude.
(78) [Robin is sitting in a windowless computer room. Bill is sleeping with
earplugs in. There is loud rain on the roof, but Bill isn’t disturbed. He wakes
up later when you can no longer hear the rain. Robin to Bill:] 
#Rainy, much?
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(79) [Robin is sitting in a windowless computer room. Bill is sleeping. There is
loud rain on the roof that wakes Bill. Robin to Bill:]
Rainy, much?
These examples show that x-much utterances behave like rising declaratives in that
their felicitous use requires that it be inferable that both speaker and addressee could act
as a source for the expressive attitude.
6.3. A formal account of rising intonation on expressives. While the behavior
of rising declaratives and x-much across these sets of tests is parallel, and while we
want to reduce these facts to the common contribution of rising intonation, making this
analysis explicit requires extending Gunlogson 2008, in particular, the definitions given
in 71 above and as A10 in the appendix below. Most pressingly, we need to understand
what it means for interlocutors to act as a joint source for u-content, which x-much ut-
terances traffic in, instead of the vanilla propositions denoted by rising declaratives. We
must also make sense of the fact that x-much utterances are not at issue (because they
are expressives), while rising declaratives are. Finally, in a point we take up in detail in
the appendix, we need our formal model of the context to allow for information to enter
via multiple dimensions, which is crucial for how composition proceeds in hybrid se-
mantics. Our particular proposal for use-conditional content and how it enters the con-
text has two parts.
First, we propose that use-conditional content can be modeled as sets of contexts—
that is, contexts in which the expression’s use conditions are met. For instance, an ex-
pression like oops is licit only in contexts in which the speaker is committed as source
to the proposition that some minor mishap has occurred. Thus, we can treat oops as de-
noting in the use-conditional domain all contexts in which that holds, as in 80.
(80) {K: A minor mishap has occurred  ∈ SSKσ}
In general, all use conditions are of the form {K: ϕ ∈ SSKσ}, where ϕ is a proposition and
σ is the holder of the expressive attitude.
Second, we propose that interlocutors, in addition to their discourse commitments
and source sets, also have a set of expressive commitments—ES—which is a set of sets
of contexts, namely a set of the kinds of objects expressives denote. This allows us to
treat expressive updates in a manner parallel to assertions. Just as asserting places a
proposition in the speaker’s source set and discourse commitments, an expressive up-
date means adding the expressive content to the speaker’s ES and then altering the con-
text so that it is consistent with the updated ES. In particular, given that use conditions
are sets of contexts {K: ϕ ∈ SSKσ} where the speaker is a source for ϕ, the effect of
adding such a set to a speaker’s ES is moving to an output context where the speaker is
the source for ϕ.
Note that the resulting context will be the same as that in which ϕ is asserted, but it
arises in a different way. The similarities and differences are both important. First, it is
clear that using an expressive commits the speaker as a source for the use conditions ob-
taining—that is, saying Oops! commits the speaker as source for the proposition that a
mishap has occurred, just as asserting that a mishap has occurred would. The differ-
ences, though, are equally important. Most importantly, the proposition that ends up in
the speaker’s source set is never part of an expression’s truth-conditional content. That
means, for instance, if response particles like yes, no, and so forth are anaphoric to an
expression and act on its truth-conditional dimension, they should be infelicitous reac-
tions to an expression that has only use-conditional content, which is the case for both
x-much utterances and their kin. It is these differences that explain why expressives
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seem inadequately translated by other means. Asserting that a mishap occurred and say-
ing Oops! feel qualitatively different, even though they commit a speaker to the same
content. Note that this implies that we do not subscribe to the view that expressive con-
tent is ineffable in the sense that you cannot provide exact conditions for it (pace Potts
2007). A better way to think of the ineffability property is in terms of Kaplan’s (1999)
mode of expression: even if expressive and truth-conditional content may contain the
same information, they convey them in very different ways. This is reflected in the sys-
tem presented here by the differences in how content may affect the source set.
In extending Gunlogson’s contexts to handle expressive content, we have mirrored
the structure of assertion at a higher level. Each interlocutor is provided with a set to
store use-conditional content, and the effect of using an expression with use-conditional
content is to unite that content with the relevant set. This approach is not accidental, and
it allows us to treat rising intonation in a perfectly parallel way across meaning dimen-
sions. Just as rising intonation on a declarative makes its assertion contingent (see 71
above), so also does rising intonation on an expressive render its use-conditional effect
contingent, as in 81.
(81) A discourse move µ by agent α expressing ε = {K: ϕ ∈ SSα} is contingent if:
a. β ≠ α is implicitly authoritative31 with respect to ε at the time of µ, and 
b. it is inferable in the discourse context that ε ∪ ESα will be withdrawn un-
less the discourse move immediately succeeding µ has the effect of ε ∪ ESβ.
The analysis of the effect of x-much on the context is now immediate. The multidimen-
sional denotation of x-much is the same as in 69. The default effect of an x-much utter-
ance would be to add its use-conditional content to the speaker’s expressive set as
described above, but because x-much requires rising intonation, this move is rendered
contingent, as in 81. This analysis, by mirroring Gunlogson’s treatment of rising declar-
atives, immediately captures those properties the two constructions share, as discussed
in §6.2, in particular, the fact that x-much utterances are inherently directed, and the fact
that their felicitous use requires both speaker and addressee to be possible sources for
the proposition that defines the expressive’s use conditions.32
Even better, though, the analysis makes further predictions about the behavior of 
x-much utterances in discourse, some of which distinguish them from rising declara-
tives and follow from the fact that x-much traffics in use-conditional content. First, we
saw that rising declaratives are different from falling declaratives in that they limit pos-
sible response particles to those like yes or yeah, which mark the addressee as a source
for the proposition at hand. If x-much utterances seek the alignment of expressive atti-
tudes—that is, if they seek an immediately following move where the addressee com-
mits to the same expressive content—the prediction is that x-much utterances should
prefer responses that indicate expressive concord. This is borne out through the behav-
ior of expressions like I know, right!? or Seriously, though!.
First, consider how these responses behave with respect to exclamatives. An excla-
mative like 82 has two aspects to its meaning. It has a truth-conditional component,
namely, that the pecan pie is tasty. It also has an expressive component, namely, that the
speaker finds the extent to which the pie is tasty surprising or unexpected.
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31 An agent is implicitly authoritative with respect to ε if it is inferable from the context that the agent is ex-
plicitly authoritative with respect to ϕ.
32 This is an additional reason why an x-much utterance cannot be used to answer a question, as shown in
27. The speaker of the question is most likely not in an epistemic position to answer the question and hence
cannot function as a source for the expressive content.
(82) What a tasty pecan pie!
One can respond to an exclamative with a response particle like yep or something larger
like I know. These responses commit the speaker as source to the proposition ex-
claimed, just as with a normal assertion. Crucially, though, they do not indicate that the
speaker is also surprised about the extent of the tastiness. They are surprise-agnostic. In
our formal system we would say that these moves do not update the speaker’s expres-
sive set with the use-conditional content of the exclamative.
(83) What a tasty pecan pie!
a. Yep.
b. (Oh,) I know.
In contrast, responses like I know, right!?, with exclamative intonation, or Seriously,
though! do indicate that the speaker is also surprised. That is, they indicate agreement
with the first speaker not just in truth-conditional terms, with respect to the pecan pie’s
tastiness, but also in expressive terms, namely, that the use of the exclamative is ex-
pressively correct in the context.
(84) What a tasty pecan pie!
a. I know, right!?
b. Seriously, though!
Since responses like these indicate agreement on the expressive dimension, we expect
them to be felicitous responses to an x-much utterance, which we have proposed makes
a contingent discourse move that seeks such alignment. The following examples show
this to be the case. In fact, these are the most natural responses when the x-much utter-
ance concerns a third party.
(85) [A man across the street is yelling at a cab as it pulls away.]
a. A: Angry, much?
b. B: I know, right!?
c. B: Seriously, though!
In contrast, our intuition is that bare response particles are generally degraded as re-
sponses to x-much utterances, as are other responses with nonexpressive intonation like
I know.33
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33 We must say ‘bare’ because response particles, especially no, can often be used in concert with additional
content to react to expressive content. This is true even with expressions that are generally agreed to make no
truth-conditional contribution at all, like oops.
(i) a. A: [drops glass, which shatters on the ground]
b. B: Oops!
c. (i) A: ?No.
(ii) A: ?Yes.
(iii) A: ?No, I meant to do that.
(iv) A: ?Yes, that was dumb.
We see similar naturally occurring examples with x-much, but note that response particles are paired not just
with continuations but with other expressive items as well, namely fucking and lol. (We thank a referee for
bringing these examples to our attention.)
(ii) a. @MrRoboticTimes angry much?
b. @saphire_blue19 Replying to @MrRoboticTimes And yeah I am angry, I’m fucking pissed.
(iii) a. @KeithCostigan haha. Angry much?
b. @manutdfan101 Replying to @KeithCostigan Lol nope, Spurs ain’t my team obviously
While we do not have a complete account of the interaction of response particles and expressives, we believe
the facts support an expressive account of x-much. Bare-particle responses are degraded relative to expressive
responses, even if response particles can at times be used with x-much just as they can be used with pure ex-
pressives like oops.
(86) [A man across the street is yelling at a cab as it pulls away.]
a. A: Angry, much?
b. (i) B: ?Yes.
(ii) B: ?No.
(iii) B: ?I know.
The contrast between 85 and 86 can be explained if response particles like yes and no
cannot easily be used to mark expressive alignment, while exclamative responses, by
bearing expressive content, can. The two-step conversation proceeds in 85 as follows.
Speaker A uses an x-much utterance, which amounts to placing its use-conditional con-
tent on her expressive set. This commits her as source to the proposition that the man is
very angry, and ridiculously so. In addition, the rising intonation of x-much marks this
move as contingent on B also adding this use-conditional content to his expressive set.
A response like I know, right?!, does precisely this. The output context would have both
interlocutors sharing the same expressive set. In addition, both would be committed as
a source to the proposition that the man was ridiculously angry.
These considerations reinforce the core claims in both this section and previous ones.
First, x-much utterances have no truth-conditional content and so should resist interac-
tion with expressions expecting truth-conditional content, as we saw in the previous
section concerning their inability to answer a question. What we have demonstrated
here is that they more easily interact with expressions that operate in the use-condi-
tional domain, like exclamatives, which we independently know commit the speaker as
a source for expressive content. If x-much utterances, by having rising intonation, seek
alignment of expressive attitudes, then this is precisely what is expected.
6.4. Summary. Rising intonation is not an accidental property of the x-much con-
struction, but key to understanding its behavior in discourse. The semantics of x-much,
as we have argued, renders x-much utterances devoid of truth-conditional content. This
raises the question of how their use-conditional content interacts with the common
ground, which is usually taken to be the sum of all of the mutual beliefs of the conversa-
tional participants and cast in terms of truth-conditional content. This section has argued
for a double-layered model of the discourse context, with one layer consisting of sets of
sets of propositions, and a second layer consisting of expressive content, which is treated
as constraints on the initial layer. Discourse moves update either layer depending on
whether the expressions involved have truth-conditional content, use-conditional con-
tent, or both. Against this backdrop, we provide an analysis of rising intonation as in
 Gunlogson 2008, where it renders discourse moves contingent. In the case of a rising de-
clarative, the speaker is made the source for a proposition just in case the addressee
makes himself a source. In the case of x-much, which bears rising intonation, the effect
is mirrored in the expressive domain. The speaker attempts to get the addressee to agree
that the x-much utterance is use-conditionally correct.
In this sense (modulo the lexical content of x-much), x-much utterances are for excla-
matives what rising declaratives are for ordinary declaratives, as illustrated in Table 1.
Expressive updates, much? 129
speaker update addressee + speaker update
truth-conditional level declaratives rising declaratives
expressive level exclamatives x-much utterances
Table 1. A typology of discourse updates.
This accounts for the behavior of x-much in discourse—most importantly, the fact
that x-much utterances both require an addressee and require the addressee to be a plau-
sible source for the content that makes the use of x-much expressively correct. In this
way, the x-much construction is a good tool for seeking mutual alignment of expressive
attitudes without putting them directly on the discourse table, which explains their use
to establish a connection (mostly when used about another person/object) or to accuse
the hearer of exaggerating.
7. Conclusion. This work provides the first detailed discussion of English x-much
and, in doing so, makes a series of novel empirical and theoretical claims. First, we
have argued that x-much is an expressive operator of the shunting kind, targeting a grad-
able predicate and adding a speaker’s evaluative attitude about the degree to which an
individual stands out on the relevant scale. Second, we have suggested that the rising in-
tonation that necessarily accompanies the construction’s use can be assimilated to that
which accompanies a rising declarative. In this way, x-much behaves like a kind of ex-
pressive question seeking alignment of attitudes. While we did not have space to tackle
this aspect of the meaning of x-much in detail, the relation between use-conditional con-
tent and the different discourse-update types is an understudied area and is ripe for sub-
sequent research that we intend to do. Showing, as we have done here, that English has
a novel use of much that derives inherently directed expressives is a solid first step.
Formal appendix
In this appendix, we formalize the ideas developed in this article. In the first part, we provide a formal im-
plementation of the core aspects of hybrid semantics sketched in §5 that employs use conditions alongside a
truth-conditional component. In the second part, we specify the formal discourse pragmatics discussed in §6.
A1. Hybrid semantics for shunting expressives. We present a formalization of the idea of hybrid se-
mantics. Since we analyzed x-much as a shunting expressive in the sense of McCready 2010, we adopt the
formal framework used there, called +. However, we slightly modify it to bring it more in line with the parl-
ance of this article. In addition, we also focus on shunting expressives and ignore mixed expressives, which
are also part of McCready’s system.34 We also ignore standard expressives like damn, since this will greatly
reduce the needed machinery. So we basically have ordinary descriptive expressions and shunting expressives
like x-much that take descriptive expressions as their argument and give back (purely) use-conditional con-
tent. We implement this by introducing a basic use-conditional type u.
(A1) Types
a. e, t, d are basic truth-conditional types for TU.
b. u is a basic use-conditional type for TU.
c. If τ is a truth-conditional type for TU, then 〈s, τ〉 is a truth-conditional type for TU.
d. If σ and τ are truth-conditional types for TU, then 〈σ, τ〉 is a truth-conditional type for TU.
e. If σ is a truth-conditional type for TU and τ is a use-conditional type for TU, then 〈σ, τ〉 is a
use-conditional type for TU.
f. The set of all types for TU is the union of all truth-conditional and use-conditional types.
The new type u is the type for use-conditional propositions. The crucial difference from ordinary propositions
is that they are a set of contexts—namely the set of contexts in which the expression is felicitously used (this
will be explicated in the next section). That is, we have the following new interpretations (beyond the stan-
dard definitions).35
(A2) Du = ℘(C): the powerset of the set of contexts is the domain of type u.
Deviating a bit from McCready’s (2010) way of handling shunting expressions, let us assume that every
expression has two meaning dimensions—truth-conditional and use-conditional content. Officially, we want
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34 Note that +CI, much like Potts’s (2005) original CI, faces some problems regarding compositionality and
cannot deal with additional phenomena like expressive modifiers (Gutzmann 2011) and quantification with
expressives (Gutzmann & McCready 2016). This is why Gutzmann 2015 recasts the systems of CI and +CI in
a compositional and consequently multidimensional way. However, since the entire machinery of this system
is far too much for the compositionally rather uninteresting x-much construction, we stick to a stripped-down
version of McCready’s system here.
35 For now, we just assume that contexts are Kaplanian contexts that (at least) involve a speaker, a time, and
a world of utterance. This is adjusted to a more specific notion in A9 below.
this to be a tuple, but let us write this using a tower notation like in the main text. The first element of the
tuple, which we write as the base of the tower, corresponds to truth-conditional content, while the second el-
ement, which we write on the top of the tower, corresponds to the use-conditional content of an expression.
uc-content
(A3) 〈tc-content, uc-content〉  tc-content
Since we only want to include shunting expressives in our system, we have to account for just two cases:
(A4) (i) the application of a (purely) truth-conditional expression to another (purely) truth-condi-
tional expression, and
(ii) the application of a (shunting) use-conditional expression to a (purely) truth-conditional ex-
pression.
The first case is rather simple, as it involves only composition at the lower level (i.e. the first element of the
tuple). Nothing happens at the use-conditional dimension. The superscripted ‘t’ here indicates that the types
in question are truth-conditional types.
(A5) Truth-conditional application (TA) 
   
α : 〈σ,τ〉 t β : σt α(β) : τ t
This is really just plain functional application with empty use-conditional dimensions. The rule for shunting
application diverges from this insofar as an expression in the use-conditional dimension (at the top) takes the
truth-conditional content of its argument and maps it onto a use-conditional proposition of type u. Crucially,
the output of this application will be the use-conditional content of the resulting expression whose truth-con-
ditional content will be empty.
(A6) Shunting application (SA)  
α : 〈σ,u〉   α(β) : u β : σ 
With this in place, we can give the semantic derivation of an x-much utterance. First, just like ordinary much,
x-much takes a set of degrees as its argument. But in contrast to ordinary much, x-much outputs a use-condi-
tional proposition. It is therefore of type 〈〈d,t〉,u〉. The argument for x-much is provided by a degree expression
applied to the contextually given argument, which we technically represent as a free variable. The degree ex-
pression applies to a variable via the rule for truth-conditional application (TA), and x-much applies to the re-
sult via shunting application (SA).
(A7) Rude, much?
x-much : 〈〈d,t〉u〉 (   ) rude : 〈e,〈d,t〉 〉 x : e
(ta) x-much : 〈〈d,t〉u〉   rude(x) : 〈d,t〉
(sa) x-much(rude(x)) : u 
So we end up with an expression that has no truth-conditional content, but has a use-conditional expression of
type u as its use-conditional content. When interpreted, this expression denotes the set of contexts in which
‘Rude, much?’ is felicitously uttered. We gave this in 69 in the main text, and repeat it here for reference.
(A8) x-much(rude(x)) g = {c : max(rude(x) g) (‘the maximal degree of rudeness of the contextu-
ally specified individual g(x)’) exceeds the contextual standard for rudeness in c, and the speaker
thinks the difference between max(rude(x) g) and the contextual standard to be ridiculously
large.}
A2. Expressive content in discourse. We start by defining simple contexts (in the style of Gunlogson
2008) for a two-agent context K in A9.
(A9) Simple contexts: A simple context K is an ordered tuple 〈DCα, DCβ, SSα, SSβ〉, where:
(i) DCσ is the set of propositions that are discourse commitments of σ,
(ii) SSσ is the set of propositions that σ is a source for, and
(iii) SSσ  DCσ.
The default effect of assertion is defined in A10 as a function A from a simple context Ki, agent σ, and sen-
tence S to an output context Ko (where i and o merely flag inputs and outputs, respectively). Recall that in hy-
brid semantics expressions do not have a single semantic value but instead denote tuples, where the first
element is that expression’s truth-conditional content. In a vanilla assertion we use the first projection to ex-
tract the proposition the sentence denotes in order to add it to the speaker’s source set.
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(A10) Assertive update: A(S,σ,Ki) = Ko iff
(i) SSσKo = SSσKi ∪ π1(S ), and
(ii) Ko is otherwise minimally different from Ki.
The notion ‘minimally different’ is given by A11–A12.
(A11) Similarity: P is more similar to R than Q (written P <R Q) just in case Q ∩ R ⊂ P ∩ R.
(A12) Minimally different: Ko is minimally different from Ki just in case there is no Kʹ such that:
(i) SSσK ' = SSKiσ ∪ π1(S ), and
(ii) ΓKʹ <ΓKi ΓKo for any other contextual parameter Γ.
We now have Gunglogson’s analysis of rising declaratives. Canonically, declaratives are asserted as in A10,
resulting in an output context where the speaker is committed to the proposition at hand as source, but rising
intonation on a declarative would render this move contingent, as in A13 (repeated from 71 in the main text).
(A13) Contingent commitment (Gunlogson 2008:123, ex. 46): A discourse move µ committing an
agent α to ϕ is a contingent commitment if:
(i) β ≠ α is implicitly authoritative36 with respect to ϕ at the time of µ, and 
(ii) it is inferable in the discourse context that α’s commitment to ϕ as a source will be with-
drawn unless the discourse move immediately succeeding µ has the effect of committing β
to ϕ as a source.
We now extend this account to expressives. The first task is to allow both truth-conditional and use-
conditional content to enter the context. Our proposal is to add a second layer to our notion of context that
stores the interlocutors’ expressive content, which we conceive of as constraints on the kinds of contexts dis-
cussed so far—that is, tuples of source sets and discourse commitments for the interlocutors.
(A14) Macrocontext: A macrocontext MC (for duologs) is an ordered 〈K, ESα, ESβ〉 where:
(i) K is a simple context,
(ii) ESα and ESβ are sets of simple contexts representing the interlocutors’ expressive commit-
ments, and
(iii) K ∈ ∩ESα ∩ ∩ESβ.
The way that use-conditional content updates an expressive set is perfectly parallel to the way that truth-
conditional content updates an agent’s source set/discourse commitments. We take use conditions to be sets of
contexts: namely, contexts in which an expression with those use conditions can be used.
(A15) Use conditions: Use conditions are of the form {K: ϕ ∈ SSKσ}, where ϕ is a proposition and σ is
the holder of the expressive attitude.
Now expressive updates operate just like assertions, but in the expressive domain—note the similarity be-
tween A10 and A16, though here we use the second projection to extract an expression’s use-conditional
 content.
(A16) Expressive update: E(S,σ,MCi) = MCo iff
a. ESσMCo = ESσMCi ∪ π2(S ), and
b. MCi and MCo are otherwise minimally different.
The ‘minimally different’ condition over macrocontexts is parallel to what was proposed before.
(A17) Minimally different (macrocontexts): MCi and MCo are minimally different just in case:
(i) ESσMCo = ESσMCi ∪ π2(S ), and 
(ii) there is no MC′ such that ΓMC′ <ΓMCi ΓMCo for any other contextual parameter Γ.
Given that use conditions are sets of contexts {K: ϕ ∈ SSKσ} where the speaker is a source for ϕ, the effect of
adding such a set to a speaker’s ES is moving to an output macrocontext where the speaker is the source for
ϕ. Note that the resulting K-context will be the same as that in which ϕ is asserted, but it arises in a different
way that explains the similarities and differences between asserting and expressing.
Finally, rising intonation behaves in a perfectly parallel way across meaning dimensions. Just as rising in-
tonation on a declarative makes its assertion contingent (see A13), rising intonation on an expressive renders
its use-conditional effect contingent, as in A18, repeated from 81 in the main text.
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36 As previously noted, an agent is implicitly authoritative with respect to ϕ if it is inferable from the con-
text that the agent would be a source for ϕ or ¬ϕ if committed to either. Essentially, it is an expectation about
a conversational participant’s knowledge state.
(A18) Contingent expressive commitment: A discourse move µ by agent α expressing ε = 
{K: ϕ ∈ SSα} is contingent if:
a. β ≠ α is implicitly authoritative37 with respect to ε at the time of µ, and
b. it is inferable in the discourse context that ε ∪ ESα will be withdrawn unless the discourse
move immediately succeeding µ has the effect of ε ∪ ESβ.
As noted above, the analysis of the effect of x-much on the context is now immediate and parallel to what we
see with rising declaratives. The multidimensional denotation of x-much is the same as in 69. The default ef-
fect of an x-much utterance would be to add its use-conditional content to the speaker’s expressive set as in
A16, but because x-much requires rising intonation, this move is rendered contingent, as in A18. By mirror-
ing Gunlogson’s treatment of rising declaratives, this analysis of x-much captures those properties the two
constructions share, as discussed in §6.
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